David Pato, Sierra County’s attorney for many years, recently won a New Mexico Supreme Court case that affirms counties’ immunity from “quiet title” suits that threaten their real estate holdings.
“The holding is meaningful to the state and all its political subdivisions, municipalities and school districts,” Pato said, “because now all these public bodies are secure in their facilities.”
Pato said the ruling came down on Oct. 15, the end of a five-year legal battle that started in two different district courts and went on to two different appellate courts, with the two cases ultimately combined by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Pato is a partner in the Nance, Pato & Stout law firm in Socorro. Adren Nance was also a litigator in the case.
Pato and Nance, according to the law firm’s website, are board-certified local government law specialists. Pato not only represents Sierra County, but also Valencia, Socorro, Catron and Cibola counties.
Pato represented Catron and Valencia counties as the cases worked their way through the court system.
New Mexico Supreme Court Justice David K. Thomson wrote the decision for the court, with Chief Justice Michael Vigil, Senior Justice Barbara J. Vigil and Justice C. Shannon Bacon concurring. Thomson and Bacon are on the Nov. 3 ballot for re-election.
Thomson’s opinion is a recapitulation of the state’s court and statutory history on the concept of “sovereign immunity”—or governmental immunity from lawsuits—as it relates to real estate.
The concept of sovereign immunity in the United States is inherited from English common law, according to Wikipedia’s “Sovereign Immunity in the United States” entry. The basis of that “legal maxim,” is “the king can do no wrong.”
Sovereign immunity was not in the U.S. Constitution, but there is the “logical inference.” Paraphrasing John Lobato and Jeffrey Theodore in a 2006 Harvard Law School article, “Federal Sovereign Immunity,” Wikipedia states, “the government cannot be compelled by the courts because it is the power of the government that creates the courts in the first place.”
The U.S. Constitution’s 11th Amendment recognized states’ sovereign immunity, with counties as state agencies being included in those protections.
New Mexico had common-law sovereign immunity, as it relates to real estate, until 1978, Thomson said, “when this Court explicitly acknowledged the abolition of the doctrine’s application in New Mexico,” in the Brosseau v. New Mexico State Highway Department decision.
Three months later, Thomson said, the legislature recreated sovereign immunity statutorily. It enacted state law 42-11-1, “prohibiting naming the state as ‘a defendant in any suit, action, case or legal proceeding involving a claim of title to or interest in real property except as specifically authorized by law.’”
One state law, enacted in 1947 by the legislature, 42-6-12, does limit sovereign immunity against quiet title suits:
42-6-12. [Consent of state in quiet title and foreclosure suits.]
Upon the conditions herein prescribed for the protection of the state of New Mexico, the consent of the state is given to be named a party in any suit which is now pending or which may hereafter be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction of the state to quiet title to or for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien upon real estate or personal property, for the purpose of securing an adjudication touching any mortgage or other lien the state may have or claim on the premises or personal property involved.
Thomson examined the law’s original bill to aid him in interpreting the legislature’s intention. He also cites the narrow interpretation the New Mexico Supreme Court gave the law in the 1958 case, Maes v. Old Lincoln County. The state can only be named in a quiet title suit if “mortgages can’t pass marketable title to a purchaser at a foreclosure sale without the state being joined in a foreclosure suit,” Thomson said.
“Although sovereign immunity can produce inequitable results,” Thomson said, “we will not judicially repeal an immunity that the legislature lawfully created unless such immunity violates the United States or New Mexico Constitution.”
In the first case argued by Pato, Belen Consolidated School District brought a quiet title suit naming Valencia County as a defendant. It wanted to sell a park to “fund school activities.” The county had been maintaining and expending public funds on the park for many years.
Pato filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the county couldn’t be named in the suit and the narrow exception to immunity carved out in state law 42-6-12 didn’t apply.
The district court wouldn’t dismiss the case, because the judge, as quoted by Thomas, opined “Valencia’s position amounted to ‘tyranny for the government to say we’re the government, you have no rights and you can’t even challenge us in court.’”
Pato petitioned the appellate court, which ordered the lower court to dismiss the case. Belen Consolidated School District petitioned the state supreme court, which upheld the appellate court’s decision.
In the second case, Gregory and Susie Nash of Catron County filed a quiet title suit, naming the county as the defendant. They claimed the county’s court complex impinged on their land.
Pato again filed a motion to dismiss the case, and the district court granted the dismissal—but reluctantly. Thomson quoted the district judge in his opinion: “It is disturbing sometimes to think that the county can just come in and take somebody’s property. . . it sounds like there were other remedies . . . that could have happened in this case.”
The Nashes petitioned the appellate court, which upheld the district court’s ruling. They petitioned the supreme court, which upheld the appellate court ruling.
Both the Nashes and Belen Consolidated School District said their rights under the 14th Amendment were being violated by their not being able to name the counties in a quiet title suit. The amendment provides “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”
Pato argued successfully due process was served because all the plaintiffs had another remedy. They could have filed an “inverse condemnation” suit against their respective counties.
Inverse condemnation suits examine government takings without just compensation.
All the plaintiffs had missed the three-year statute of limitations for filing such a suit, however.
Supreme Court Justice Thomson agreed, stating neither “Nash nor Belen established an actual deprivation of property . . . neither made timely assertion or claim for inverse condemnation, which is the proper and exclusive remedy.”
The larger issue revealed in this state supreme court case, beyond the power of the state in aquiring public lands, may be the court’s deference to the legislature in following the letter of the law in making its unanimous decision.
“It is the particular domain of the legislature,” Thomson wrote in his opinion, “as the voice of the people, to make public policy.”